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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue of the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(j) (Rep.Vol. 9 2002).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Court below err in granting the defendants1 motion for a

protective order and denying plaintiff's motion to compel discovery? Trial court
rulings on motions to compel and for protective orders are reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. Park v. Case, 2001 UT App. 232. The issue was preserved by the
parties' respective motions and memoranda. R. File #3 at 785-833.
2.

Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment based upon

plaintiff's failure to make a pretrial demonstration of its entitlement to relief? The
grant of a motion for summary judgment is reviewed without deference to the trial
court. Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2002 UT App. 406. The issue was
preserved by plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion. R. File #3
at 1052-1066.
STATEMENT OF CASE
The present action was commenced in 1995 when Macris & Associates, Inc.
sued Neways, Inc. and Thomas and Leslie Mower in an effort to set aside a fraudulent
transfer. The complaint alleged that the Mowers caused one corporation they
controlled, Images & Attitudes, Inc., to transfer all its assets to another corporation
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they controlled, Neways, Inc., in an effort to place such assets beyond the reach of
Macris, which then had a pending breach of contract claim against Images. The Macris
claim against Images ultimately resulted in a judgment for Macris that was affirmed on
appeal. See Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Images & Attitudes, Inc., 941 P.2d 636
(Utah App. 1997). The complaint in this case sought to make Neways and the Mowers
liable for the claim against Images under three theories: fraudulent transfer, alter ego
and successor corporation.
The defendants moved for summary judgment in this action, arguing that the
judgment against Images barred this action under principles of res judicata as they
could and should have been litigated in the prior action. The trial court granted
summary judgment to the defendants and Macris appealed.
This Court reversed the ruling of the trial court, holding that the doctrine of
claim preclusion was not a bar to this action. See Macris & Associates, Inc. v.
Newavs, Inc., 1999 UT App. 230. Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
and affirmed in part and reversed in part. See Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Newavs,
Inc., 2000 UT 93. The Supreme Court held that Macrisf claims in this action were not
barred by claim preclusion but also held that under the doctrine of issue preclusion the
contract damages to which Macris was entitled would be limited to those established in
the Macris v. Images trial.
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Following remand to the trial court, Neways caused the judgment entered on
Maoris' behalf against Images to be satisfied. The defendants in the present action then
moved for summary judgment, arguing that satisfaction of the judgment against Images
rendered Macris' claim in this case moot. Macris resisted the motion as it pertained to
the Mowers, arguing that the Mowers' conduct required Macris to bring suit against
Neways to set aside the fraudulent transfer and that Macris' attorney fees in this action
represented a consequential damage for which the Mowers should be liable and
provided a basis for the imposition of possible punitive damages. The court granted the
defendants' motion.
On appeal, this Court reversed. See Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways,
Inc.. 2002 UT App. 406. This Court held that Macris may have an entitlement to
attorney fees (and possibly punitive damages). This Court held that
in order to recover attorney fees under the third-party
exception, Macris must also show that [this action] was a
natural consequence of Image's breach and that it was
necessary to bring this action. This is also a question of
fact inappropriate for summary judgment.
(Emphasis added.)
Following remand, Macris served discovery requests upon defendants,
essentially seeking to have defendants acknowledge that in 1992 the Mowers caused
Images to transfer all its assets to Neways in exchange for no consideration, thereby
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rendering Images incapable of satisfying any judgment rendered against it. These
requests are set forth in the addendum hereto.
Defendants responded to each discovery request with an identical objection
and no other response.
Defendants object to this interrogatory as irrelevant and
not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
This action has been remanded to the District Court by
the Court of Appeals for the express purpose of reaching
a determination as to the propriety of awarding Plaintiff
attorney fees against Defendants under the third-party
litigation exception to the general rule that attorney fees
are not recoverable in an action for breach of contract
unless expressly provided for in the contract. In order to
make this determination, Plaintiff must show that this
action "was a natural consequence of Image's breach and
that it was necessary to bring the action." Macris &
Assoc, v. Newavs. Inc., 60 P.3d 1176 (Utah Ct. App.
2002). Unless and until Plaintiff can show that this
action was necessary in order to collect the judgment
against Images and that plaintiff incurred attorney fees in
pursuing the debt against Images, the parties do not need
to address successor liability, alter ego liability, and/or
fraudulent conveyance. Because Plaintiff has not yet
shown that attorney fees were accrued in pursuing the
judgment against Images, the issues of successor and
alter ego liability and fraudulent conveyance that are
addressed in this interrogatory are irrelevant and not
likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
R. File #3 at 829.
Following this objection, Macris moved to compel and defendants sought a
protective order barring any discovery. The trial court denied Macris' motion and

4

granted the defendants' motion, ruling that the discovery requests were "premature and
may be unnecessary." R. File #3 at 860.
Thereafter, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that
they were entitled to summary judgment because Macris had failed to come forward
with affirmative evidence that this action was made necessary by the alleged fraudulent
transfer.
Macris resisted the motion, arguing that the allegations of the complaint
(which were unrebutted) and the history of the parties' litigation raised a reasonable
inference that this action was necessary to pursue satisfaction of its claim, which
inference could not be rejected on a motion for summary judgment. The trial court
granted defendants' motion.
The evidence relied on by defendants in seeking summary judgment was the
fact that Macris first made written demand on Images for satisfaction of the judgment
on February 1, 2001 and the judgment was satisfied on February 16, 2001. R. File #3
at 885. These facts, coupled with Macris' failure to provide additional evidence in
response to defendants' motion, were the basis upon which defendants argued an
entitlement to judgment.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Macris' theory of why this action was necessary to recover on its claim
against Images is very simple: by transferring all its assets to Neways, Images had
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rendered itself unable to respond to Macris' claim and Macris needed to set aside that
transfer to have Images' assets restored to it. In seeking to prove that Images
fraudulently transferred all its assets, Macris propounded simple discovery requests
inquiring into what was transferred, what was paid for it, and what assets were retained
by Images. The defendants' argument, and the trial court's ruling, that defendants
were not required to respond to such requests until Macris produced affirmative
evidence, from sources other than the defendants, that this action was a necessary
consequence of Images fraudulent transfer is both illogical and without support in the
law.
After denying Macris the opportunity to obtain pretrial proof of its claim
from the defendants, the lower court compounded its error by granting summary
judgment to defendants even though defendants offered no evidence whatsoever to rebut
the allegations of plaintiff's complaint. Neways presented no evidence that the transfer
it received from Images wasn't fraudulent or that it had the ability to satisfy Macris'
claim. Despite this failure, Neways and the Mowers were granted summary judgment
on the theory that Macris had some obligation to produce evidence, prior to trial,
showing a prima facie entitlement to recovery. This ruling has no support in the law of
Utah or any other jurisdiction.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.

The Court Below Abused Its Discretion In Denying Plaintiff s Motion
to Compel Discovery.
Under Utah law, it is axiomatic that the discovery rules are to be interpreted

liberally to permit discovery. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in State Road
Comm'nv. Petty. 17 Utah 2d 382, 412 P.2d 914 (Utah 1966),
A primary purpose of the new Rules of civil Procedure
was to simplify procedures and to "secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
One of the means of accomplishing this is to permit
discovery of information which will aid in eliminating
noncontroversial matters, and in identifying, narrowing
and clarifying the issues on which contest may prove to
be necessary. Insofar as discovery will serve this
purpose it should be liberally permitted.
412 P.2d at 917.
In the instant case, Macris sought discovery from the defendants designed to
establish that Images fraudulently transferred its assets to Neways, that Images and
Neways were both the alter egos of the Mowers, that Neways was the successor
corporation of Images and that Images retained no assets with which it could satisfy
Macris' claim. For example, interrogatory number 13 asked: "What assets owned by
Images & Attitudes as of August 30, 1992, were not acquired by Neways, Inc. pursuant
to the Asset Purchase Agreement dated August 31, 1992?"
While acknowledging that the discovery requests were relevant to the three
causes of action of plaintiff s complaint, defendants asserted that they need not respond
7

to such relevant inquiries "unless and until" Macris could demonstrate this action was
necessary to recover on its claim against Images. This novel proposition, with which
the court below agreed, was supported by no citation of authority and for good reason:
there is none. Plaintiff is aware of no authority for the proposition that a plaintiff must
make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief before being permitted to conduct
discovery.
Rule 26(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part,
that
[parties] may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the
claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to te
claim or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, matters, custody, condition and
location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things and the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of any discoverable matter.
The rule does not condition the right to discovery on some preliminary
evidentiary showing of an entitlement to relief, nor has any appellate court ever so
construed it. Indeed, both the Utah Supreme Court and several federal courts have held
that the obligation to respond to discovery is not removed because a defendant has filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint as legally insufficient to state a claim. In Schmitt v.
Billings. 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979), the Court held that the pendency of a motion to
dismiss did not relieve the defendants from their obligation to respond to discovery.
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The court granted judgment to the plaintiff for the defendants' failure to timely respond
to requests for admission even though they had moved to dismiss the complaint. See
also. Lipskv v. Commonwealth United Corp.. 551 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1976); Alexander
v. F.B.I. 194 F.R.D. 316 (D. D.C. 2000).
If a party is entitled to discovery without even demonstrating that its
complaint states a claim for relief, it can hardly be questioned that a party is entitled to
discovery without first providing an evidentiary basis for its claim.
The irony the ruling of the court below is that it deprived Macris from
obtaining the very species of evidence the court felt it needed to provide to support its
claim. Macris' theory of why the action against Neways was necessary to recovery on
its claim against Images was simple: Images transferred all its assets to Neways and had
nothing left from which the claim could be satisfied. If that transfer was fraudulent (as
alleged), it could be set aside and the assets looked to for recovery. However, the
court refused to require the defendants to say what they paid for the assets transferred
or what Images had left following the transfer. Truthful responses to such questions
would have revealed exactly why this suit was made necessary by the fraudulent
transfer.
The suggestion that a party should not have to respond to discovery until the
court is convinced of the merits of the plaintiff's claim is inconsistent with the whole
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purpose of the rules of discovery. As this Court said in Roundy v. Staley, 984 P.2d
404, 407 (Utah App. 1999), the
purpose [of Utah's discovery rules] is to make procedure
as simple and efficient as possible by eliminating any
useless ritual, undue rigidities or technicalities which
may have become engrafted is our law; and to remove
elements of surprise or trickery so the parties and the
court can determine the facts and resolve the issues as
directly, fairly and expeditiously as possible.
984 P.2d at 407 (quoting Ellis v. Gilbert. 429 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah 1967)).
This purpose is directly inconsistent with a ruling that no discovery could be
had on plaintiffs claims "unless and until" plaintiff had made an evidentiary showing
sufficient to satisfy the court of its likelihood of prevailing on the merits. That is a
requirement unknown to modern discovery procedure and constitutes an abuse of the
court's discretion.
As this Court has previously held, a court's error in failing to require
discovery is presumed to have been prejudicial and mandates reversal. In Askew v.
Hardman, 884 P.2d 1258 (Utah App. 1994), reversed on other grounds, 918 P.2d 469
(Utah 1996), this Court stated that
[prejudice is presumed because to require the requesting
party to show the error was harmful would place the
requesting party in the untenable position of having to
demonstrate that the contents of inaccessible information
would have affected the outcome of the case. Because
the requesting party does not have the information, he or
she will never be able to demonstrate that the trial court's
erroneous denial of a discovery request was anything but
10

harmless. The burden of demonstrating that the
erroneous denial of a discovery request was not
prejudicial must therefore rest with the party resisting
discovery.
884 P.2d at 1262-63.
Accordingly, the judgment rendered below must be reversed.
POINT II.

The Court Below Erred in Granting Summary Judgment.

The court below erred in granting summary judgment by placing an
affirmative duty upon the plaintiff to offer evidence in support of its complaint when
the law does not contain such a requirement and by failing to recognize that the
undisputed facts in this case give rise to competing inferences which can only be
resolved by the fact finder.
The complaint alleged that Images fraudulently transferred its assets to
Neways and was incapable of satisfying Macris' claim for breach of contract. The
defendants have offered no evidence to the contrary. The undisputed facts are that
Macris obtained judgment against Images in 1995. It was not paid, despite Macris1
efforts to locate assets to execute upon. Thereafter, the court held that Neways was
bound by the judgment and Macris garnished Neways' bank accounts. To obtain a
release of the garnishments, Neways posted a bond pending its appeal of the trial
court's ruling. This occurred in 1997. The case proceeded to this Court and then the
Supreme Court. In each court Neways argued it had no liability for the judgment. In
December of 2000, the court held that Neways may be liable to Macris but reversed the
11

trial court's decision that it was in privity with Images, holding a question of fact to be
present. After Neways1 argument that it couldn't be held liable for the judgment
against Images was rejected, the judgment was paid by a check drawn on Bank One
which showed "Neways International, Inc." as the remitter of the check. R. File #3 at
882-90.
Macris suggests that the inference to be drawn from these facts is simple:
when confronted with potential liability for receiving a fraudulent transfer (a charge it
has never sought to refute), Neways saw the handwriting on the wall and paid up to
avoid ongoing litigation expenses.
The defendants suggest a different inference. Pointing to the evidence that
counsel for Macris wrote to counsel for Images, a Neways' employee, and demanded
payment of the judgment, which was satisfied within two weeks thereafter, defendants
suggest it can be inferred that if Macris had simply asked Images to pay the judgment it
would have done so without the need to sue Neways.
Under the undisputed facts, the court below erred in granting summary for
two reasons. First, in moving for summary judgment, defendants failed to meet their
burden under Rule 56 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to establish the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Second, the court ignored the inference available under
the evidence which was favorable to the plaintiffs position, which it was improper to
do.
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In reviewing defendants' motion for summary judgment it is apparent that the
defendants offered no evidence that the Images judgment would have been paid without
the need for the Neways litigation. Indeed, they concede that they have no such
evidence. f,[T]he parties will never know if the Images' judgment would have been
satisfied because Macris failed to make a demand after judgment was entered." Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 5 R. File #3 1072.
Before a party moving for summary judgment can require the nonmoving
party to produce evidence in support of the allegations of its complaint, the moving
party must meet its burden of demonstrating the lack of a genuine issue of material fact.
If it fails to do so the nonmoving party has no duty to present any evidence.
This principle was enunciated in the landmark United States Supreme Court
case of Adickes v. Kress & Co.. 398 U.S. 144 (1970), In Adickes, the plaintiff alleged
that her civil rights had been violated as a result of a conspiracy between Kress and the
city police. She alleged that she was denied service in a restaurant because she was in
a racially mixed group. She alleged that when she was refused service there was a
policeman in the store who subsequently arrested her outside the store for vagrancy.
The defendant moved for summary judgment on the conspiracy claim,
arguing that the plaintiff had no evidence of any conspiracy. The District Court
granted the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court, however,
reversed. The court held that because the defendants had failed to meet their burden as
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the moving party, plaintiff was under no duty to produce anything in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment.
As the moving party, respondent had the burden of
showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,
and for these purposes the material it lodged must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party.
398 U.S. at 157.
After noting that the defendants had failed to negate with any evidence the
allegation that an officer was present when the refusal to serve occurred, or therefore
the inference that it was at his direction, the court noted that Rule 56(e) places no
affirmative duty on the nonmoving party if the moving party has not met its burden.
[B]oth the commentary and background of the 1963
amendment conclusively shows that it was not intended
to modify the burden of the moving party under Rule
56(c) to show initially the absence a genuine issue
concerning any material fact. The Advisory Committee
note on the amendment states that the changes were not
designed to "affect the ordinary standard applicable to
summary judgment." And, in a comment directed
specifically to a contention like respondents, the
Committee stated that "[wjhere the evidentiary matter in
support of the motion does not establish the absence of a
genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even if
no opposing evidentiary matter is presented.
398 U.S. at 159-60. (Emphasis in original).
In the instant case, the defendants presented no evidence that Images had the
capability of paying the claim of Macris. In the absence of such evidence they did not
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meet their burden of negating a genuine issue of fact and Macris had no obligation to
present any evidence on that point.
Additionally, on the undisputed facts before the court, the evidence was
susceptible to two different inferences, as set forth above, and it was error for the court
to resolve those competing inferences in favor of the defendant. As this Court noted in
West v. Thomson Newspapers. 835 P.2d 179 (Utah App. 1992), reversed on other
grounds, 879 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994), citing Adickes, summary judgment cannot
properly be granted unless the moving party presents evidence which would "foreclose
[ ] the possibility of the existence of certain facts" from which a jury could draw an
inference in favor of the nonmoving party. 835 P.2d at 188. See also, Goodman v.
Sullivan, 2002 UT 21.
In light of the defendants' failure to meet their burden under Rule 56, and the
existence of competing inferences from the evidence before the court, it was error for
the court to grant summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
The court below committed reversible error in failing to require defendants to
respond to discovery. Such error requires that the judgment be vacated and the matter
remanded with instructions to require the defendants to respond to plaintiff's discovery.
Additionally, the court erred in granting summary judgment both on the basis
of the record as it exists and by requiring plaintiff to offer affirmative evidence even
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though defendants did not meet their burden under Rule 56. The judgment should be
vacated and the matter remanded for trial.
DATED this^jftldav of Ti\ft/wJL

2005.

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

By Y^.MutJ.CrLA
M. David Eckersley
Attorneys for Appellant
Maoris & Associates, Inc
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BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP
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Telephone: (801)531-3000
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Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

vs.

)
)
)
])

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES
TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET
OF INTERROGATORIES
TO DEFENDANTS

NEWAYS, INC., THOMAS E. MOWER,
and LESLIE D. MOWER,

)
J1

Civil No. 950400093CN

]

Honorable Anthony Schofield

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures, Defendants, Neways,
Inc., Thomas E. Mower, and Leslie D. Mower ("Defendants"), respond to Plaintiffs First Set of
Interrogatories to Defendants (the "Interrogatories"), as follows:

UT DOCS A #1131144 v1

GENERAL OBJECTIONS
1.

Defendants object to the Interrogatories on the grounds that they are

overbroad, unduly burdensome, and seek information that is neither relevant to the subject matter
of this action, nor likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
2.

Defendants object to the Interrogatories to the extent that th6y call for the

production of information that is protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product
doctrine.
3.

Defendants object to the Interrogatories to the extent that they purport to

impose any obligations upon Defendants that exceed the obligations imposed by Rules 26, 33,
and 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
4.

Defendants object to the Interrogatories to the extent that they seek

information for time periods other than those periods relevant to the determination of the issues
in this dispute.
Subject to the foregoing general objections and qualifications, and to any specific
objection made below, Defendants responds as follows:
RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

Identify the shareholders of Neways? Inc. from

September 1, 1992 to the present, indicating amounts of shares owned by each shareholder
identified.
RESPONSE:

Defendants object to this interrogatory as irrelevant and not likely

to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. This action has been remanded to the District

UT DOCS A #1131144 v1
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Court by the Court of Appeals for the express purpose of reaching a determination as to the
propriety of awarding Plaintiff attorney fees against Defendants under the third-party litigation
exception to the general rule that attorney fees are not recoverable in an action for breach of
contract unless expressly provided for in the contract. In order to make this determination,
Plaintiff must show that this action "was a natural consequence of Image's breach and that it was
necessary to bring the action." Macric & Assoc, v. Neways, Inc., 60 P.3d 1176, 1181 (Utah Ct.
App. 2002). Unless and until Plaintiff can show that this action was necessary in order to collect
the judgment against Images and that Plaintiff incurred attoimey fees in pursuing the debt against
Images, the parties do not need to address successor liability, alter ego liability, and/or fraudulent
conveyance. Because Plaintiff has not yet shown that this action was necessary in order to
collect the judgment against Images, which judgment was paid in full on February 16, 2001, and
because Plaintiff has not yet shown that attorney fees were accrued in pursuing the judgment
against Images, the issues of successor and alter ego liability and fraudulent conveyance that are
addressed in this interrogatory are irrelevant and not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

What consideration was paid by Neways, Inc. to

Images & Attitudes, Inc. for the acquisition of the assets of Images & Attitudes, Inc.?
RESPONSE:

See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by

reference.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

UT_DOCS_A #1131144 v1

When was such consideration paid?

3

RESPONSE:

See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by

reference.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4:
RESPONSE:

How was such consideration paid?

See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by

reference.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

Who negotiated with Images & Attitudes, Inc. on

behalf of Neways, Inc. in connection with Neways, Inc.'s acquisition of the assets of Images &
Attitudes, Inc.?
RESPONSE:

See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by

reference.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

Who negotiated with Neways, Inc. on behalf of

Images & Attitudes, Inc., in connection with Neways, Inc.'s acquisition of the assets of Images
& Attitudes, Inc.?
RESPONSE:

See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by

reference.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

Indicate what liabilities of Images & Attitudes,

Inc., Neways, Inc. did not intend to assume pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement dated
August 31, 1992.
RESPONSE:

See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by

reference.
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INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

Indicate all amounts paid by Neways, Inc. on the

long term debts listed on the balance sheet of Images & Attitudes dated 8/31/92.
RESPONSE:

See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by

reference.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

Indicate to whom each of the notes payable listed

on the Images & Attitudes, Inc. balance sheet of 8/31/92 were owed and when such obligations
were due.
RESPONSE:

See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by

reference.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10:

Identify the Board of Directors of Neways, Inc.

as of August 31, 1992.
RESPONSE:

See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by

reference.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Identify the Board of Directors of Images &
Attitudes, Inc. as of August 31, 1992.
RESPONSE:

See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by

reference.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12:

What was the total value of the assets owned by

Neways, Inc. as of August 30,1992.
RESPONSE:

See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by

reference.
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INTERROGATORY NO. 13: What assets owned by Images & Attitudes, Inc.
as of August 30, 1992, were not acquired by Neways, Inc. pursuant to the Asset Purchase
Agreement dated August 31, 1992.
RESPONSE:

See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by

reference.
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Did Neways, Inc. pay any legal expenses of
Images & Attitudes, Inc. which were incurred after September 1, 1992?
RESPONSE:

See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by

reference.
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: If the answer to the preceding interrogatory is
yes, state the reason such payments were made.
RESPONSE:

See Response to Interrogatory 1, which is incorporated herein by

reference.
DATED this

of May 2003.
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP

Mark R. Gaylord, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendants
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RECE'VED
IIJN "•

2003

Prince N 'V_- >\Ge'dzahief

Mark R. Gaylord, Esq. (#5073)
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP

One Utah Center, Suite 600
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2221
Telephone: (801)531-3000
Facsimile: (801)531-3001
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES TO
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR
ADMISSIONS TO DEFENDANTS

vs.

)
)
)
]

NEWAYS, INC., THOMAS E. MOWER,
and LESLIE D. MOWER,

)1
)

Civil No. 950400093CN

Plaintiff,

Honorable Anthony Schofield
Defendants.

]

Pursuant to Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures, Defendants, Neways,
Inc., Thomas E. Mower, and Leslie D. Mower ("Defendants"), respond to Plaintiffs Request for
Admission to Defendants (the "Requests"), as follows:
GENERAL OBJECTIONS
1.

Defendants object to the Requests because they improperly seek to use

pretrial discovery to obtain premature disclosure of Defendants' trial witnesses and exhibits.
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Discovery in this case has not been completed, and as such, Defendants have not determined the
witnesses they intend to call or the documents and exhibits they intend to use at the trial of this
matter. As such, the Requests seek to require speculation about Defendants' future decisions,
and further seek to require information immune from discovery, because it constitutes opinion
work product. Defendants shall provide such information in accordance with Rule 26(a)(4) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2.

Defendants object to the Requests to the extent that they call for the

production of information and documents that are protected by the attorney-client privilege and
the work-product doctrine.
3.

Defendants objects to the Requests to the extent that they purport to

impose any obligations upon Defendants that exceed the obligations imposed by Rules 26, 33,
and 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
4.

Defendants object to the Requests on the ground that they are overbroad,

unduly burdensome, and seek information that is neither relevant to the subject matter of this
action, nor likely to lead to the discovery of admissible.
RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
REQUEST NO. 1:

Admit that the long term debt listed on the Images &

Attitudes, Inc. balance sheet as of 8/31/92 as "Note-pay - Australia $699,276.55" is a false entry.
RESPONSE:

Defendants object to this interrogatory as irrelevant and not likely

to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. This action has been remanded to the District
Court by the Court of Appeals for the express purpose of reaching a determination as to the
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propriety of awarding Plaintiff attorney fees against Defendants under the third-party litigation
exception to the general rule that attorney fees are not recoverable in an action for breach of
contract unless expressly provided for in the contract. In order to make this determination,
Plaintiff must show that this action "was a natural consequence of Image's breach and that it was
necessary to bring the action." Macric & Assoc, v. Neways, Inc., 60 P.3d 1176, 1181 (Utah Ct.
App. 2002). Unless and until Plaintiff can show that this action was necessary in order to collect
the judgment against Images and that Plaintiff incurred attorney fees in pursuing the debt against
Images, the parties do not need to address successor liability, alter ego liability, and/or jfraudulent
conveyance. Because Plaintiff has not yet shown that this action was necessary in order to
collect the judgment against Images, which judgment was paid in full on February 16, 2001, and
because Plaintiff has not yet shown that attorney fees were accrued in pursuing the judgment
against Images, the issues of successor and alter ego liability and fraudulent conveyance that are
addressed in this interrogatory are irrelevant and not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.
REQUEST NO. 2:

Admit Neways, Inc. made no cash payment to Images &

Attitudes, Inc. pursuant to the terms of Exhibit C to the Asset Purchase Agreement dated August
31, 1992.
RESPONSE:

Defendants incorporate by this reference their response to

Request No. 1 as though fully set forth herein.
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DATED this ^ ^ day of May 2003.
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP

Mark R. Gaylord, Esq
Attorneys for Defendants
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